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United we restrain, divided we rule:
Neoliberal Reforms and Labor
Unions in Turkey and Mexico
Basak Kus and Isik Ozel
 
Introduction
1 The past few decades have seen a series of neoliberal policy reforms take place in the
developing  world  which  attempted  to  make  markets  work  more  “freely”  and
“efficiently.” Increasing the flexibility of the labor market was among the most central
objectives of these reforms. Government policies regarding the collective representation
of  labor underwent substantial  changes in this  context.  The nature of  the change in
question has not been uniform, however. Although taming the power of unions so as to
decrease resistance to market reforms and increase labor market flexibility remained a
somewhat common objective to the neoliberal agenda across all nations, governments
employed  different  strategies  and  means  to  achieve  these  ends.  Identifying  the
differences  in  the  ways  governments  dealt  with  unions  in  the  context  of  neoliberal
reforms constitutes  an important  step towards understanding the varying courses  of
change that nations’ union movements have undergone.
2 In this article we cross-examine the transformation of the union movements in Turkey
and  Mexico  in  the  context  of  neoliberal  reforms.  As  the  data  will  show,  the  union
movement in Turkey has become more concentrated in the neoliberal  era,  while the
union  movement  in  Mexico  has  become  more  fragmented.  We  discuss  how  the
historically  varying  patterns  of  government-union  interaction  played  a  role  in  the
emergence  of  such  divergent  forms  of  change  in  these  nations’  union  movements,
notwithstanding the common objective shared by both their governments of appeasing
the unions. 
3 We should note from the outset that the purpose of our analysis is not to provide a
definitive  explanation  for  the  overall  patterns  of  change  observed  in  Turkey’s  and
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Mexico’s union movements  – a task which can only be accomplished by analyzing in
detail  the interplay  of  multiple  social,  political  and  economic  factors,  but  rather  to
specifically explore the role the states played in these respective countries in coming to
shape a more fragmented union movement in one case, and a more concentrated one in
the other through the various strategies and tools they used in the context of reforms.
 
I. Neoliberal Reforms and Labor Unions
4 The early literature on globalization and neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s
embraced the idea that governments all over the world were in the process of abandoning
their distinctive institutions and policies, and embarking on a set of common strategies in
an attempt to adapt to the various pressures imposed upon them by the global markets.
Flexible labor markets  unencumbered by strong unions were seen as among the key
elements  of  the  predicted  “neoliberal  convergence”  across  nations,  along  with  the
minimalist welfare state, reduced taxation and limited business regulation (Campbell &
Pedersen 2001: 5, 271). 
5 To be clear, the anticipation of national capitalisms converging around a set of objectives
and policies was not unfounded at all. Employers and policymakers across the world had
indeed employed reform rhetoric that remained strikingly similar (Thelen & Kume 1999).
Nevertheless, the evidence that has accumulated over the past few decades has shown
that  in  their  quest  to  become  globally-integrated  market  economies,  nations  have
prioritized different policy objectives or have taken different routes to achieving similar
outcomes. Whereas the earlier studies of globalization and market reforms had talked
about homogenous change culminating in the “erosion of national capitalisms” (Weiss
2003: 3), more recent research has highlighted the differences in the national histories,
institutional structures, social relations, interests, and ideas that have caused the process
and outcome of reforms to vary in different national contexts (Hall 1986, 2001; Block
1990; Weiss 1998, 2003; Campbell & Pedersen 2001; Fligstein 2001; Hall & Soskice 2001; Hay
2001; Murillo 2001; Blyth 2002; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb 2002; Swank 2003; Prasad
2006).
6 In  cross-examining  the  patterns  of  change  in  the  union  movements  of  Turkey  and
Mexico, our contribution in this article is to this more recent literature that highlights
the  cross-national  differences.  While  we  acknowledge  the  similarity  in  both  context
– that governments have attempted to diminish the political potency of labor unions in
their  attempt to  create  market  economies –  we go one step further  to  highlight  the
different  ways in which they have done so,  which,  we argue,  ultimately yielded two
divergent  patterns  of  change  in  the  structure  of  these  nations’  union  movements
– towards more centralization and concentration in the case of Turkey, and towards more
fragmentation and decentralization in the case of Mexico. 
7 Turkey  and  Mexico  provide  particularly  suitable  comparative  cases  to  explore  the
transformation of the union movement in the neoliberal reform era, as well as the role of
the state in this process. Specifically, Turkey and Mexico are both nations with similar
levels of development, which, at the onset of reforms, had structurally similar economies.
Both followed import substitution principles, were dominated by large corporations, and
had fairly equal shares of industry, agriculture and services in total national income. Yet,
the historical development of the union movement and the state's specific relation to it
remained starkly different in these two cases.  As we shall  discuss in the rest  of  this
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article, these historical differences were critical to the specific courses of action that each
government would take in dealing with the labor unions in the course of  neoliberal
reforms.  The  Turkish  and Mexican governments  undertaking  neoliberal  reforms  had
different experiences, hence different understandings, with respect to the role unions
play in the democratic and policy processes,  the political power they posses,  and the
nature of challenge they posed to market reforms; hence, they utilized different means
and strategies to deal with them.
8 We begin by providing an historical panorama of the state-labor union relations in each
country prior to the neoliberal reform period. We then shift our focus to the context of
neoliberal reforms. We show that in Mexico, until the onset of neoliberal restructuring,
less  than  a  handful  of  extremely  strong  unions  organized  at  the  industry-level
represented the labor force in an authoritarian-corporatist arrangement. In this context,
where labor had maintained a close and co-dependent relationship with the previous
governments, the challenge was understood as making sure that the economic reform
agenda  would  not  be  kidnapped  by  a  few  powerful  unions.  Under  the  banner  of
“democratizing”  the  union  movement  the  Salinas  government  (1988-1994)  thus
attempted to break the political power of what remained a centralized and concentrated
union  movement  led  by  well-known  union  leaders.  The  tool  kit  of  the  Mexican
government in carrying on such policy however remained rather limited.  Due to the
historical co-dependence which had come to define state-labor union relations in Mexico
throughout the post-war era, the Mexican government found its hands relatively tied in
the  process.  Consequently,  the  government  resorted  to  subtle  tactics,  such  as
encouraging “new unionism” so as not to push the unions away, while at the same time
employing divide-and-rule strategies through the back door. The use of such tactics was
not limited to the Salinas government, but widely used by the successive governments in
order to assuage the actual  and anticipated reaction of  unions against the neoliberal
reforms, as well as to create new alliances with pro-reform unions. Partly due to these
policies, the total number of unions increased in Mexico throughout the 1990s, while the
associational monopoly over the union movement of the few large unions, measured by
the  percentage  of  unions  and  unionized  workers  affiliated  with  them,  decreased
substantially.
9 In Turkey, on the other hand, the organization of the union movement displayed a much
more fragmented structure from the beginning, with a large number of unions operating
at both the workplace and industry levels. Although a more corporatist and centralized
structure had emerged in the early 1950s with the establishment of  a national  labor
confederation,  Türk-İş,  this  was  undermined  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  as  the  labor
movement became increasingly fragmented and politicized with a large number of unions
advocating for change on issues that went far beyond the protection of worker interests.
Creating  a  centralized  and  de-politicized  union  movement  with  narrowly  defined
interests  remained central  to  the  agenda  of  the  government  that  took  office  in  the
aftermath of a military coup early in the 1980s, as well as to that of its successors. Unlike
the Mexican case where the government had resorted to more subtle tactics to break the
power of a centralized and concentrated labor movement, which had maintained a long-
lasting corporatist relationship with the state, the Turkish government remained able to
carry on its agenda through decisive legal changes that drastically restricted labor’s right
to unionize. In a matter of a decade only (from 1975 to 1985), the number of labor unions
in Turkey dropped from 781 to 99.
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Figure 1: Neoliberal Reforms and Labor Unions in Turkey and Mexico
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 II. Neoliberal Reforms and Labor Unions in Turkey:
United We Restrain
10 In Turkey, until the end of the 1950s the political parties in power displayed a consistent
effort to limit the autonomy and agency of what remained a rather small working class
population through authoritarian and semi-corporatist means, and it is only in the 1960s
and 1970s that labor unions became a powerful independent actor in Turkish politics. 
 
Authoritarian State and Rival Unionism
11 Although in the early 1920s, the founding years of the Republic, the military and civilian
elites  who  had  led  the  Independence  War  had  supported the  formation  of  workers’
associations, seeing them on par with their anti-imperialist struggle1,  such supportive
attitude had proved to be quite short-lived (Mello 2006: 211). Once they consolidated their
power,  these elites,  united under the CHP (Republican People’s Party),  the party that
would rule for almost three decades in a single-party system, became adamant about
repressing  all  forms  of  political  associations,  including  labor  unions,  which  could
potentially pose a threat to the stability of the regime (Ahmad 1977; Keyder 1987; Mello
2006).  The  Law  for  the  Maintenance  of  Public  Order  adopted  in  1925  constituted  a
significant  legal  step  along  these  lines,  characterizing  early  on  the  authoritarian
framework within which state officials would tackle the social cleavages in the country.
Relying on this law, the CHP government closed down the existing labor unions, along
with nascent opposition parties and religious orders. 
12 The state’s suppression of labor organizations became more intense in the 1930s (Mello
2006). The Law of Associations adopted in 1938 declared illegal all associations based on
family, community, religious or class interests (Önder 1990: 89). From a political point of
view,  these changes were designed to prevent any challenges to the official  ideology
emphasizing national  unity and solidarity.  From an economic stance,  also,  they were
functional for they promoted the growth of industry by keeping wages down and the
labor force docile (Mello 2006: 212). 
13 With the transition into a multi-party system and the adoption of direct suffrage in the
mid-1940s state-labor union relations took a slightly new turn. Realizing the importance
of winning workers’ support for victory at the ballot box, the CHP government lifted the
ban on class-based associations. The Law of the Worker and Employer Unions and Union
Associations adopted in 1947,  which would remain the operative legal  framework for
labor union activity until 1963, defined it a constitutional right – the right of citizens to
form associations, including unions, without prior permission from the government. Be
that as it may, the law in its essence hardly represented a break or a discontinuity in the
state’s authoritarian approach to labor. Rather, it constituted a preemptive strategy on
the  part  of  the  government,  as  Cizre  (1992:  714)  observes,  to  control  the  form and
substance  of  the  labor  unions,  whose  number  and influence  had  been increasing.  It
forbade  unions  from establishing  any  financial  or  administrative  links  with  political
parties, for instance, as well as from forming alliances among themselves without the
backing of the government. These legal provisions essentially aimed at thwarting the
formation of a strong and centralized union movement, while making sure at the same
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time that unions would not become venues to disseminate the ideas of certain political,
mainly leftist, parties and groups. The result of such policy, which some scholars dubbed
“rival  unionism”  (Dereli  1968;  Önder  1990),was  a  union  movement  consistent  of  a
multitude of small local unions with few members, no substantial powers, and devoid of
political activity. In other words, a pluralist organizational structure had emerged, which
allowed room for the formation of an unlimited number of unions in the same branch of
industry, but this had not happened under democratic premises. It had taken place, on
the contrary,  in a persistently authoritarian framework aimed at preventing working
class  mobilization  from  gaining  salience  through  centralization,  thereby  keeping  it
“vulnerable to state-monitoring” (Cizre 1992: 714).
 
The Democrat Party Government and the Incorporation of
Corporatist Elements
14 Turkey’s first general elections in 1950 terminated the three-decade-long single party
rule by bringing DP (Democrat Party) into government. The DP’s coming to power was
received optimistically among workers, for when in opposition, the leading politicians of
the party had promised to extend rights to labor including the right to strike. The DP
government accommodated some of these expectations by granting certain concessions
to labor including paid holidays, sick days and a minimum wage. Nevertheless,  state-
union relations in this period, for the most part, exhibited continuity with past policies.
As Cizre notes, the main legal-regulatory framework within which unions operated in the
DP era was still that of the 1947 Act “with its restrictions and prohibitions on ‘all’ aspects
of union life”(1992: 715). Although it had put the right to strike on its party program in
1949, for instance, the DP had abandoned the idea altogether as early as the end of its
first year in office, resorting instead to maintaining the interventionist role of the state so
as to prevent the growth of labor’s political agency (Cizre 1992). That being said, there
were still some differences in the way state officials confronted social cleavages in the
country, which made the nature of state-union interaction during the DP administration
distinct in some aspects from the single party era (Mello 2006: 124). For one, the DP’s
approach  to  the  labor  unions  was  “non-pluralist”  and  embodied  elements  of  state
corporatism. As Bianchi points out, the repressive policies of the state towards unions
were “gradually being supplemented by attempts to enlist the support and cooperation of
still weak and insecure interest group leaders in implementing economic policies without
substantially  increasing  their  political  economy or  widening  their  roles  in  policy
formation” (Bianchi 1984: 106 quoted in Mello 2006: 124). An important step along these
lines  was  the  formation  of  a  nation-wide  labor  organization  in  1952  – Türk-İş,  a
confederation that would play the role of a mediator between the government and the
unions. As Tunay (1979: 37 quoted in Önder 1990: 144) notes, the Democrats considered
Türk-İş  a  convenient  tool  to  help  control  the  fragmented  labor  movement  largely
consisting of small and local unions, and to enlist the support of labor when necessary
through certain concessions. The DP’s semi-corporatist relationship with Türk-İş did not
prove to be a lasting one, however.  As time passed unions found some of their most
significant demands unmet, the most important of which being the right to strike, and
this began to create discontent and unrest on the part of rank-and-file members (Önder
1990). The tension between the government and labor increased further in the second
half of the 1950s as the economic performance of the country turned worse and labor’s
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conditions worsened with it. The DP’s efforts to prevent any class-based political action
against  its  administration  became  more  intense  in  this  context,  and  the  party
increasingly resorted to authoritarian elements. 
 
Developmental State and the Labor: Increasing Fragmentation and
Politicization of the Unions
15 Democrat Party rule ended with a military takeover in May of 1960. The aftermath of the
coup was characterized by the “rise of an ideological enthusiasm” to institute a sound
growth strategy along “positivist-rationalist grounds” (Ünay 2006: 57). The sound growth
strategy in question was a planned industrialization effort relying on import-substitution
policy. The state would promote the growth of the manufacturing sector, and protect it
by heavily restricting and even banning imports of locally produced goods. Social and
political incorporation of the working class was a key policy objective for the new ruling
elites. The state-labor union relations in previous decades had largely taken place in an
authoritarian framework. The corporatist measures employed had been short-lived and
had often been undermined by the authoritarian tendencies of the government. Starting
from the 1960s, however, the state began to abandon repressive measures to control labor
activism and instead resorted to more liberal corporatist arrangements. The 1960s and
the 1970s saw, therefore, substantial improvement in the social rights and real wages of
workers (see Figure 2). Retirement pensions, health, children and housing benefits were
all extended in this period. With the Unions Act of 1963, freedom of unionization was put
under constitutional guarantee, and collective bargaining and strike rights were granted
for the first time. The membership base of the labor unions expanded significantly in this
period. The state encouraged a multi-union organization by allowing the formation of
local unions at the work place, federations of unions in the same branch of industry,
regional labor unions, as well as national confederations (Önder 1990: 180). 
 
Figure 2: Increase in Real Wages (1963=100)
Source: The Ministry of Labor
 
United we restrain, divided we rule: Neoliberal Reforms and Labor Unions in T...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 11 | 2010
7
Table 1: The Increase in the Number of Unions and Union Members
 
Total  union
membership
Union  membership  as  %  of  wage
earners
Number  of
unions
1950 76,000 5.90 88
1960 282,967 15.50 432
1970 2,088,215 53.80 737
Source: The Ministry of Labor
16 The  leftist  movement  also  found  a  welcoming  ground  in  the  permissive  legal
environment of the 1960s and 1970s with important implications for the labor movement.
A significant development in this regard was the establishment of TİP (Workers Party of
Turkey) in 1961, which emphasized class differences, and advocated for a non-capitalist
path  of  development  (Mello  2006:  220).  Another important  development  was  the
foundation of DİSK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions) in 1967. The founders
of  DİSK who aligned themselves  with TİP rejected the docile  nature  of  labor  unions
operating in the country, as well as the “above party politics” stance that Türk-İş had
been carrying on. DİSK’s objectives were not simply confined to improving the status of
labor in the country, but involved restructuring the workings of the state, economy and
society with respect to a wide range of issues from land reform to foreign affairs (Sunar
1974).  Whereas  Türk-İş  had  been  operating  within  the  ideological  and  institutional
boundaries of the existing system, DİSK explicitly sought to challenge them. By the end of
the  1960s  the  confederation  had  already  become,  in  the  words  of  Dodd,  “hardly
distinguishable  from  a  political  body  in  organizing  invariably  violent  May  Day
demonstrations, engaging in political propaganda, and taking the lead in denouncing the
rightist coalition governments” (Dodd 1983: 41, quoted in Mello 2006: 222). 
17 DİSK’s rapidly growing influence and membership base, which had already reached to
500,000 by 1980 from 67,000 in 1967 (Mello 2006: 158) eventually had an impact on Türk-İş
as well, turning the latter’s policies away from a pragmatic stance towards a more activist
and leftist  stance.  As  several  scholars  have  noted,  what  took place  in  the  nature  of
unionization in the 1960s and 1970s, as such, was a shift from “job unionism” concerned
only with pragmatic bread-and-butter issues to “political/ideological unionism” (Cizre
1992: 715; Mello 2006: 147). A major component of this change was the frequent strikes
(see Figure 3) and rallies, which often took a violent form. With the foundation of the
Confederation  of  Nationalist  Trade  Unions  (MİSK)  in  1970,  and  in  1976  Hak-İş,  the
fundamentalist confederation known for its close ties to the religiously oriented MSP
(National  Salvation Party),  the labor union movement in Turkey became increasingly
fragmented ideologically and involved increasingly violent elements.
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Figure 3: Number of Strikes per year
Source: Önder, 1999
 
Turkish Unionism in the Neoliberal Era: Towards Centralization and
Concentration
18 The wave of neoliberalism took Turkey in its orbit at the end of the 1970s. The promising
economic performance that the Turkish economy had displayed had come to halt by the
second half of the 1970s. The country suffered from serious foreign exchange and debt
crises  and  the  inflation  rate  reached  triple-digit  figures.  The  deterioration  of  the
economic conditions was accompanied by social  unrest.  The early elections that took
place  in  this  context,  in  October  of  1979,  put  Demirel’s  center-right  Justice  Party  in
government.  The priority  of  the new government was to fix  the economic problems
facing the nation. Turgut Özal, who was in charge of the State Planning Organization
(SPO),  the  pinnacle  of  economic  bureaucracy  at  the  time,  was  appointed  as  the
Undersecretary  of  Prime  Ministry.  In  this  position,  Özal  announced  a  stabilization
package on 24 January 1980, widely known as the “January 24 decisions”. The package
constituted a turning point in Turkish economic history, signifying the end of planned
development and the beginning of a market-oriented restructuring process. It involved a
wide range of policy changes from liberalization of finance and exchange rate regimes to
that of foreign trade.
19 The country was deeply divided ideologically around these developments, and violence
took over the streets. On 12 September 1980 the Turkish Armed Forces stepped in to
restore political stability.  The interim military government that was established right
after the 1980 coup backed up the market-oriented reform process by appointing Turgut
Özal to the position of deputy Prime Minister. After the country’s return to civilian rule
in 1983 Özal became the Prime Minister and continued his ambitious reform agenda. In
short, between 1980 and 1989, under Özal’s continuous leadership, Turkey experienced a
decisive political-economic transformation. Turkey had experimented with liberalization
reforms prior to the 1980s; however, these had been short-lived. What started in 1980 was
a forceful and continuous reform process that would radically recast the relationship
between the state, economy and society. 
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20 Turkey’s neoliberal restructuring process involved important implications for the labor
movement and the unions. As is the case in other nations undertaking neoliberal reforms,
the Turkish government – both the interim government that ruled during the three years
immediately following the military coup and the civilian government that came to power
in 1983 –  considered labor  a  major  challenge to  market  reforms and to  the political
stability of the country. As Adaman et al note, the tolerance for class-based activity had
“rapidly eroded after a period of less than two decades when labor unions appeared as
important social  actors” (2009: 173).  Labor would soon find its position in the formal
policymaking process marginalized, its real wages significantly diminished, many of its
recently  achieved  social  benefits  curtailed,  and  its  associational  rights  considerably
restricted.
 
Labor’s Challenge and the Constitution of State Labor Policy under
Neoliberalism
21 In Turkey, the government’s labor policy, at the onset of neoliberal reforms in the early
1980s, remained focused on erasing what was deemed the “unionist malaise of the 1960s
and 1970s,” namely, “the proliferation of unions, the infiltration of ideological unionism
at the leadership level  and lack of  trade union leadership capable of  restraining the
membership” (Cizre-Sakallioglu 1991: 61).  The workplace unionism and the number of
unions was seen as having proliferated under the legal framework system set up by the
1963 Labor Act to an extent that was incompatible with the socio-economic conditions of
the country (Önder 1999). Moreover political unionism – of the leftist brand represented
by  DİSK2 in  particular –  was  perceived  as  something  whose  development  should  be
prevented for the sake of the unity of the state and society (Özbudun 1991). 
22 What the interim government envisaged was a centralized union movement with very
narrowly defined objectives that would be supervised by the state (Önder 1999). Unlike in
the Mexican case, where the government had to engage in subtle tactics and resort to
informal channels when necessary in dealing with the unions and executing what were
considered to be anti-labor policies, the governments undertaking the neoliberal reforms
in Turkey would carry on their agenda through explicit legal changes.
23 Two pieces  of  legislation  adopted  in  1983  entailed  particularly  important  provisions
regulating union activities (Önder 1999: 207) – Acts 2821 (Trade Unions Act) and 2822 (the
Collective Bargaining Strike and Lockout Act). These new laws did not forbid workers
from joining unions but forbade membership to more than one union. The right to strike
was severely restricted as well. Moreover, according to these new laws (Articles 13 and 14
of Act 2822) only those labor unions that obtained a certificate of competence from the
Ministry of Labor could negotiate a collective agreement. The new laws introduced very
strict conditions for the issue of this certification. It required a trade union to represent a
minimum of 10% of all workers in a particular industry, and 50% + 1 of all the workers in
an individual establishment, in order to be eligible for collective bargaining. In addition,
the new legislation permitted only industrial branch unions operating at the national
levels  and  part  of  national  confederations  so  as  to  promote  a  centralized  and
concentrated trade union organization “capable of controlling the membership” as Önder
puts it, “but greatly restricted in power and resources vis-à-visthe state and employers”
(1999: 234).  What is more,  the new laws also restricted the definition of labor unions
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strictly to industrial relations by imposing a comprehensive ban on the political activities
of the unions. 
24 Market liberalizing reforms continued full force with the return to electoral democracy in
1983. The legal framework that was put in place by the interim military government was
maintained after  transition to  the civilian regime.  The legal  changes  concerning the
collective  representation of  labor,  which were maintained after  transition to civilian
regime, have led to concentration and centralization of the labor movement, as well as to
its de-politicization. As Figure 4 shows, the number of labor unions dropped significantly
in Turkey,  particularly after 1984.  Furthermore,  the institutional restructuring of  the
state, which involved centralization of the policymaking process within a narrow circle
including the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers, cut off of the mechanisms for
including labor unions in the policymaking process. Throughout the 1980s Turk-İş, which
after the banning of DİSK had become virtually the only representative of labor, was
consistently left out of the decision making processes concerning labor. 
 
Figure 4: Centralization and Concentration in Turkish Unionism in the Neoliberal Era
Source:  Önder, 1999
25 The significant concentration and centralization in the labor union field, as well as the
increasing exclusion of labor from the official policymaking process had two important
implications for the Turkish labor union movement at the turn of the decade. First, these
policies  eventually  had  an  impact  on  Türk-İş  turning  its  strategies  vis-à-vis  the
government  away from non-partisan politics  (Önder  1999).  Having  experienced their
strategy of cooperation and non-partisan politics fail at granting them a seat at decision
making tables, Türk-İş leaders in the 1990s increasingly began to take on a political tone
in  raising  their  concerns  with  governments’  labor  policies.  A  second  important
implication has been the increasing prominence of Hak-İş – a confederation representing
a form of unionism based on national and religious values. Hak-İş had been set up in 1976,
with only seven unions and 20,000 worker members, with the support of MSP (National
Salvation Party), as part of the party’s attempt to extend its sphere of influence into the
labor  movement  (Duran  & Yildirim 2005:  231).  The  confederation  did  not  achieve  a
significant following among workers at the outset. This was in part due to the fact that
the  objectives  the  Confederation  upheld  remained  irrelevant  to  a  large  segment  of
workers. As Duran and Yildirim (2005: 232) note, for instance, Hak-İş viewed the conflict
between labor and capital as artificial, and emphasized the commonality of employer and
employee interests on the basis of Muslim brotherhood. Its major demands in collective
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negotiations included small mosques or prayer rooms in factories, and allowance for time
off for individual and collective prayers and pilgrimage (Duran & Yildirim 2005: 231). In
the context of the grave economic conditions of the late 1970s, such objectives appealed
only to a small segment of workers. In addition, most important sections of the working
class had already been organized. It was only at the newly opened state enterprises and
small and medium sized private establishments where Hak-İş was able to find suitable
ground for unionization. The military take-over in September 1980, however, provided a
window of opportunity for the Confederation. As a result of military regime’s policy of
encouraging Islamic identity in an attempt to weaken the leftist tendencies of workers,
Hak-İş was allowed by the military authorities to recommence operations less than a year
after the coup. As the only confederation, apart from Türk-İş, that was open throughout
the 1980s, it grew rapidly in the post-1980 period, and managed to establish itself as a
major labor organization whose base cannot be limited to strictly Islamist segments of
the labour movement3. 
26 The  long-term  implications  of  these  developments  for  Turkish  unionism  and  its
relationship to the state require further analysis. Our point here, simply, is that the
specific courses of action taken by national governments in the context of neoliberal
reforms, as well as the various short and long-term implications of these reforms, were
significantly shaped by their specific histories of unionization. As we will discuss in the
next section, it is due to the variation in the historical context that the governments in
Mexico  undertook  policies  that  appear  so  drastically  different  from  their  Turkish
counterparts, leading, as a result, to a more fragmented labor union movement. 
 
III. Neoliberalism and Labor Unions in Mexico: Divided
We Rule
A Historical Panorama: Emergence of Corporatism and
Centralization in Mexican Unionism
27 State-labor  relations  in  Mexico  were  institutionalized between  the  1910s  and  1930s:
Unions that had fought with the army of Venustano Carranza during the revolution were
granted with a broad range of rights by the 1917 Constitution, which made the state the
arbiter of labor-management disputes (Collier 1992). Labor confederations such as CROM
– The  Regional  Confederation  of  Mexican  Workers  (1918)  and  CGT –  The  General
Confederation of Workers (1921) were founded in the aftermath of the Constitution and
began relying on state patronage paving the way for a state-dependent labor movement
(Roxborough  1984:  14).  In  the  1930s,  during  Cardenas’  rule  (1934-1940),  labor  was
incorporated into the functional structure of the PRM (Party of the Mexican Revolution),
the predecessor of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), forming a central support
base for the dominant-party regime’s emerging populist alliance. The Confederation of
Mexican Workers (CTM), which was founded in 1936 with the direct support of Cardenas
for unionization and unification of the fragmented labor movement, became the major
ally of  the emerging regime.  The alliance with labor endowed the state with various
mechanisms for controlling and coopting labor, and the resulting capacity to implement
centrist policies (Fairris & Levine 2004; Collier 1992). In return, labor was incorporated
into  corporatist  arrangements  that  provided  access  to  the  state  and  policy-making
platforms.  This  period  of  institutionalization  bore  an  interdependent  relationship
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between labor unions and the state. Institutionalized links between the unions and the
PRI regime were used as mechanisms of political control in which cooptation of union
leadership played a central role (Bizberg 1990; Collier 1992; Murillo 2001). State control
over the unions helped foster a receptive climate for foreign investment, as industrial
conflict was discouraged by means of cooptation. Co-opted unions used various means,
including coercion and bribery, to restrain wage demands arisen from their rank-and-file,
while the absence of  intra-union democracy facilitated the use of  these means.  Such
cooptation enhanced the capacity of the Mexican state to control and subordinate labor
to public policy, a major legacy of state-labor relations in Mexico (Collier 1992; Bizberg
1990; Cook 2007; Murillo 2001). 
28 The state distributed a wide range of resources to the unions in exchange for political
support and acquiescence based on a double-layered cooptation process: that of the state
over unions and of the union leaders over their constituencies. The state-labor alliance
created a strong partisan loyalty of labor to the PRI, while providing the unions with
access to the state and a broad range of benefits (Bizberg 1990; Murillo 2001).  Union
leaders received various incentives in exchange for repressing dissent and cultivating
support  for  the  PRI  (Tulchin  & Selee  2003;  Collier  &  Collier  1991).  These  incentives
provided in exchange for loyalty were expansive for the union bosses, who often used the
unions as a stepping stone for political careers through a quota of elected posts granted
for union leaders in the PRI. In turn, the PRI regime, which effectively used the rhetoric
of revolutionary family,  used this alliance as a political machine to co-opt labor.  The
cooperation of organized labor with the state, as well as its cooptation, facilitated the
implementation of even unpopular policies, which then played an important role in the
price  stability  achieved  throughout  the  period  of  so-called  stabilizing  development
(Collier 1992: 47). Such capacity of the Mexican state to implement policy became a legacy
that  was  used throughout  the neoliberal  reform process,  which entailed unfavorable
policies for labor. 
29 Therefore, the relationship between the Mexican state and “official unions” like the CTM
took a highly state-dependent and interventionist pattern, while any opposition against
this pattern would be purged through the close cooperation between the state and the
union bosses. Although various factions and ideologies had existed within organized labor
in the 1930s, the Marxists were purged in the 1940s. Fidel Velazquez’s taking over the
leadership of the CTM in 1941 indicated a shift away from radicalism to pragmatism and
increasing cooptation with the ruling party (Collier 1992: 47; Collier & Collier 1991: 414).
The Mexican state’s cooptation of union leaders is epitomized by the so-called “charrazo”
incidence based on the state’s conflict with the Railroad Workers’ Union in 1948. In this
incidence, the state replaced the dissident leader of the Railroad Workers’ Union with a
rival  called  “el  Charro,”  whom  the  state  could  easily  co-opt.4 Thus,  the  charrazo
phenomenon symbolizes the state-control of union leaders and union leaders’ control
over their constituencies through undemocratic management detached from grassroots
(Collier 1992: 44; Collier & Collier 1991: 584; Cook 1995).
30 An immediate consequence of  the charrazo incidence was the emergence of  dissident
unions  as  a  reaction  against  the  state  control  of  the  union  bosses.  The  inter-union
rivalries  intensified  with  the  emergence  of  such  dissident unions  often  provided  a
channel for the state “to play one confederation off against another” (Collier 1992: 55).
The Mexican state counterbalanced the powerful unions and confederations by using “an
allied confederation as a bulwark against a dissident union” (Collier & Collier 1991: 583;
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Murillo 2001: 43). For instance, in its attempt to control dissident unions by means of
integrating them into official unionism, the state founded the Labor Congress (CT) in 1966
as an umbrella confederation, which provided “a new arena for union competition within
the  boundaries  of  the  party”  (Bizberg 1990:  115;  Murillo  2001:  43).  Dissident  unions’
challenges against official unionism and the hegemony of the CTM accelerated in the
1970s,  epitomized  by  the  Declaration  of  Guadalajara  and  the  Democratic  Tendency
Movement.  Nevertheless,  such  challenges  remained  far  from  breaking  the  CTM’s
hegemony (Murillo 2001). In the early 1980s, the industry-wide centralized unions were
still  very strong. Following the launching of neoliberal restructuring processes in the
1980s, however, the landscape of Mexican unionism changed drastically,  as it became
highly fragmented. Such fragmentation occurred, in part, through deliberate strategies of
the Mexican state in the context of the neoliberal restructuring process. 
 
Neoliberal Restructuring and Fragmentation in Mexican Unionism
31 Mexican  unionism  has  become  increasingly  fragmented  since  the  beginning  of  the
country’s neoliberal restructuring in the 1980s. Confronted by opposition, even by the
official unions, the reforming governments in the 1980s and 1990s resorted to a “divide-
and-rule strategy.” In doing so, they diverged from their counterparts in Turkey, who
opted for strategy of centralization in dealing with the labor unions in the context of the
neoliberal restructuring process. Thus, the outcome of this strategy has been increasing
fragmentation and decentralization in Mexico, unlike the increasing centralization and
concentration in Turkey. 
32 A common view about  the  impact  of  neoliberal  reforms  on labor  politics  in  Mexico
suggests that neoliberal reforms ended the state-labor alliance and curtailed the political
power of the unions (Collier 1992; Cook 1995; de la Garza Toledo 1994).  According to
Collier the “state-labor alliance became too costly in the context of the commitment to
economic restructuring” (1992: 120, 140), since traditional state-labor relations in Mexico
were incompatible with neoliberal policies. In a similar vein, Cook claims that neoliberal
restructuring  brought  about  a  “dramatic  reduction  in  organized  labor’s  political
influence and the virtual destruction of union militancy and autonomy” (1995: 77). This
view underlines labor’s failure to confront neoliberalism and its increasing subordination
to the reforming governments (Paczynska 2009).
33 However,  the  empirical  reality  with  respect  to  the  changes  in  government-union
relations has been more complex than what this view proposes. Acknowledging the major
changes  in  state-labor  relations  in  the  face  of  neoliberal  restructuring,  this  article
suggests that the major strategy implemented by the Mexican governments has been to
fragment and decentralize organized labor in order to weaken the opposition to reforms
and promote the emergence of new unions, which, then, became the new allies of the
governments  in  their  embrace  of  neoliberal  reforms.  Union  competition  has  been
intensified  in  this  process,  while  the  ways  in  which  the  state  manipulated  this
competition has been diversified. Official unions’ capacity to deliver declined paralleled
with their restrained negotiating authority,  while their acquiescence to state policies
increased further (Fairris & Levine 2004; Paczynska 2009). 
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The new unionism and increasing fragmentation in Mexico 
34 Throughout the neoliberal restructuring process, the Mexican state continuously created
new allies that would provide a support base for its policies. Extensively using a divide-
and-rule  strategy  in  the  1980s  and 1990s,  the  state  attempted  to  diffuse  opposition.
Through one such attempt, the so-called “new unionism” became an instrument through
which sources of opposition were eliminated. “The new unionism” entailed a thorough
restructuring in state-labor relations,  such as promoting flexible forms of bargaining,
representative and democratic unions, and a new labor culture geared toward increasing
productivity in line with the pressures posed by the forces of globalization (de la Garza
Toledo  1994;  Cook  1995;  Murillo  2001).  Multinational  corporations  in  Mexico  also
promoted  the  so-called  modernization  of  the  labor  movement  proposed  by  Salinas,
particularly the flexibilization of collective bargaining. 
35 In  its  fight  against  the  powerful  labor  confederations  that  opposed  the  neoliberal
restructuring  process,  the  Salinas  government  pursued  a  “divide-and-rule”  strategy,
decentralizing  and  dividing  labor  whenever  possible,  and  continuously  shifting  its
alliances. It openly supported the new unionism and the emergence of rival unions, such
as the FESEBES (Federation of Goods and Services Unions) in order to diminish the CTM’s
power. Besides supporting the emergence of rival unions, it also favored the emergence
of cliques within the confederations and unions, such as the FESEBES-CROC front as an
alternative to the CTM (Murillo 2001: 108). President Salinas’ May Day Speech in 1990
portrays the pillars of new unionism promoted by the government: 
Unions would participate in agreements to modernize production, pursue a kind of
productivity that would distribute wealth, improve working conditions, expand the
knowledge base, and involve workers in company administration and ownership.
..Wages would be based on productivity and training, and the state would have to
respect  union autonomy in  order  to  create  a  model  of  labor  relations  that  was
participatory,  democratic,  and  based  on  concertation  (not  conflict  and
confrontation) (De la Garza Toledo 1994: 213). 
36 New  unionism  was  mainly  represented  by  FESEBES,  which  was  formed  in  1990  to
challenge the hegemony of the CTM (de la Garza Toledo 1994; Cook 1995). FESEBES, and
two  of  its  leading  members,  STRM  (Telephone  Workers’  Union)  and  SME  (Electrical
Workers’ Union), symbolize the labor movement’s partial adaptation to neoliberalism and
resulting  restructuring  of  state-society  relations.  Hernandez  Juarez,  the  head  of  the
STRM, became the vanguard leader of New Unionism, which proposed cooperation rather
than confrontation in order to modernize key sectors to face the challenges posed by
globalization,  and  endorsed  the  reforming  governments  in  successive  stages  of  the
neoliberal transition, the most important of which were privatization and the NAFTA
agreement (Murillo 2001). 
37 In line with its goal of decentralization through a divide-and-rule strategy, the Salinas
government favored the transfer of unions from the CTM to the CROC (the Revolutionary
Confederation of Workers and Peasants) & CROM, the CTM’s rival confederations (Murillo
2001). Reforming governments helped accelerate fragmentation and decentralization by
means  of  building  alliances  with  the  newly-emerging unions,  promoting  inter-union
rivalry, supporting new unionism, and reducing labor’s participation in the PRI (Cook
1995: 86). Reforming governments used inter-union rivalries to diminish the power of the
dissident unions and union bosses, and justified their shifting alliances by the rhetoric of
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democratizing  the  unions,  cleaning  up  the  corrupt  unions  and  eliminating  the
empowered union bosses. The campaign against the union bosses intensified during the
Salinas  rule.  In  its  attack  on  the  union  bosses  and  their  opposition  to  government
policies, his government used coercive means, epitomized by the “La Quina incidence,”
where the government authorized a military raid against Joaquin Hernandez Galicia, the
dissident leader of the Oil Workers’ Union (Collier 1992: 137). Although increasing union
autonomy and democratization were the claimed objectives of the governments in the
1980s and 1990s, the extent to which these objectives have been attained is yet subject to
question (Cook 2007; Paczynska 2009). 
38 Whenever reforming governments, starting with that of de la Madrid, were confronted
with union militancy against neoliberal policies, they opted for weakening the sources of
militancy by dividing and supporting the rivals. The CTM vs. CROC rivalry during the
government of de la Madrid epitomizes reforming governments’ continuously shifting
alliances:  When  the  former  did  not  support  the  government  regarding  its  austerity
measures,  the  government  began favoring the latter  (Roxborough 1989;  Collier  1992;
Murillo 2001). Another common tool was delinking the unions from the PRI, signified by
the CTM which was left with one representative on the National Executive Committee of
the  PRI  by  1991  and  the  SNTE  (Teachers’  Union),  whose  power  was  undercut  by
transferring authority over education policy from the central government to the federal
governments. Thus, subordination (by coercive or non-coercive means), erratic inclusion
and exclusion, delinking and fragmentation became the major strategies throughout the
neoliberal restructuring process. 
39 The Mexican state sustained its capacity to implement policy throughout the neoliberal
restructuring  process,  facilitated  by  labor’s  weakening  due  to  fragmentation,  its
subordination  and  shifting  loyalties  (Murillo  2001;  Paczynska  2009).  Organized  labor
continued participating  in  the  corporatist  pacts  throughout  the  neoliberal  transition
process in the 1980s and 1990s. Its demands, however, were mostly subordinated to those
of the reforming governments and the business elite. The most important of these pacts
was the Economic Solidarity Pact of 1987 (PSE), which imposed harsh austerity measures
such as a wage freeze as part of its stabilization package without incorporating labor’s
demands, indicating the political marginalization of labor (Collier 1992: 111). Thus, the
capacity of the Mexican state to impose policies persisted in the 1980s and 1990s, despite
increasing dissent by various labor unions. The pacts signed throughout the neoliberal
restructuring  era  indicate  a  shift  with  respect  to  undermining  labor’s  power,  while
diminishing labor’s participation in policy-making platforms to de-jure form (Alba 1992;
de la Garza Toledo 1994; Middlebrook 1989). The pacts negotiated and signed in the 1980s
and 1990s were mostly imposed on the official unions by the state, as labor’s role was
diminished  to  ratifying  the  agreements  that  had  been  already  negotiated  between
business and the state. Therefore, on paper, all confederations associated with the PRI
seemed to have supported the neoliberal policies, including the NAFTA agreement in 1994
and consecutive pacts that entailed severe stabilization measures (de la Garza Toledo
2004).  The acquiescence of  the unions was only possible through union bosses’  party
loyalties and their capacity to control their constituencies (Murillo 2001). 
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“Democratization” and fragmentation in Mexico: Emergence of the
National Union of Workers
40 The  endorsement  of  governments’  neoliberal  policies  caused  a  major  divide  and
competition within organized labor. The representativeness of the CT and CTM declined
over  time,  as  many  unions  pulled  out  of  these  confederations.  For  instance,  the
percentage of unions not included in the CT rose from 4% in 1984 to 22% in 1997 (see
Figure  5).  Inter-union  rivalry  has  intensified,  bolstered  by  the  burgeoning  and
strengthening of the independent unions.
 
Figure 5: Fragmentation in Mexican Unionism (1986, 1993, 1997)*
 (Original Source: Aguilar Garcia, Francisco Javier 1989. “Estructura de la Población trabajadora y de
los sindicalizados en Mexico al ﬁnal del Siglo XX.” Mexico City: STPS Concurso de Investigación
Laboral.
*CT= Congreso de Trabajo/ Labor Congress
Source: Gates, Leslie 2001
41 Dissident unionism went through a revival after the 1980s and 1990s. The formation of
the National Union of Workers (UNT) as a new federation by eight unions’ leaving the CT
in  1997,  indicates  the  intensification  of  competition  and  fragmentation.  The  UNT
launched a program of union democratization, asserting that unions’ democratization
would contribute to an overall democratic transition in Mexico, and promoted a “new
social  pact”  emphasizing  its  willingness  to  take  part  in  increasing  productivity  if
democratic and independent unions were secured.5 While the UNT generally supported
neoliberal restructuring in the aftermath of its emergence, it began to rally opposition
against the neoliberal agenda of the National Action Party (PAN) governments after 2000.6
The UNT led the formation of broader alliances such as the Front for Unions, Peasants,
Indigenous and Popular Sectors (FSCISP) to call for a broad struggle against neoliberal
policies. 
42 Contrary to what was anticipated before the end of seven-decades-long PRI rule in 2000,
the  relationship  between  the  official  unions  and  the  Mexican  government  has  not
undergone major  changes.  Even the appointment  of  Carlos  Abascal  Carranza,  former
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chair of the Mexican Employers Association, as the Secretary of Labor, did not hinder
close ties between the government and official unions’ leaders. Therefore, the pattern of
union leaders’  cooptation through resource distribution in exchange for acquiescence
persisted during the PAN’s rule since 2000. 
43 Confronted with various forms of manipulation bolstered by intensified fragmentation
and  competition,  organized  labor,  particularly  the  official  unions,  did  not  opt  for
independence from the state, but rather settled on sustaining their dependency on the
state, striving to access the benefits distributed by the state including careers in politics
(Cook 2007; Murillo 2001). This, indeed, became a survival strategy for the official unions,
whose existence depended on state resources. What Collier and Collier (1991: 597) refer to
as “constant renegotiation of the labor-state alliance,” referring to state-labor relations
in Mexico before the neoliberal era, also persisted during the neoliberal transformation.
Where state-labor relations developed in a pattern of interventionism, cooptation and
dependence on the state, these legacies persist and shape neoliberal transitions, rather
than disappearing.  
 
Conclusion
44 Based on a comparative analysis of the Turkish and Mexican cases, this article showed
how nations made use of entirely different strategies and instruments to “deal with”
labor unions in the context of neoliberal reforms. The authors argued that such variation
in  state  policy  towards  unions  across  these  two  countries  with  otherwise  similar
characteristics  resulted from the distinct  historical  patterns that  characterized state-
labor relations, and the process of unionization in each of these countries. In Turkey,
post-1980 governments sought to deal with what they saw as the challenge of an overly-
fragmented and politicized Turkish labor movement. In a “unite and restrain” strategy,
which was executed through explicit legal changes, the Turkish state sought to create a
more centralized and concentrated union movement with fewer players, and succeeded
at doing so. In Mexico, on the other hand, the state sought to break the power of large
unions in a “divide and rule” strategy, so as to grant itself more flexibility in carrying out
its reform agenda. Due to its historical co-dependency with the labor unions, however,
the Mexican state had to resort to subtle tactics and discourses such as “new unionism” in
carrying out its agenda, so as to dissipate potential reaction from the powerful unions.
This involved, on the one hand, supporting the formation of new unions and forming
alliances with them so as to gather support for politically costly reforms, and, on the
other hand, sustaining its patronage distribution to the major union leaders. As a result
of this strategy, the number of unions in Mexico increased throughout the 1990s, while
the associational monopoly over the union movement by the few large unions decreased.
The differences between Turkey and Mexico suggest that, contrary to the convergence
view that has been animating a substantial portion of the literature on globalization and
neoliberal reforms, states were able to pursue the common objective of appeasing societal
resistance to neoliberal reforms by means of different strategies, and that the repertoire
for those strategies was shaped their distinct historical trajectories.
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NOTES
1.  The  1924  Constitution,  which  was  adopted  right  after  the  foundation  of  the  Republic,
recognized the freedom of association as the right of all citizens prompting the formation of new
unions across the country, for instance.
2.  Indeed, although the activities of both left and right unions were suspended in the context of
military intervention, the measures taken against DİSK were exceptional. As Adaman et al note,
the confederation would see “its assets confiscated, its leaders brought to court with political
charges calling for death penalty in certain cases, and not be able to resume its activities until
1992” (2009: 173).
3.  Hak-İş  which  started  with  about  20,000  members  in  1976  today  has  more  than 400,000
members. As Duran and Yildirim (2005) discuss in detail, a major outcome of this expansion in
membership base has been the inclusion in the Confederation’s policies of non-religious issues
such asdemocratization and the development of political and social rights. In 1990, for the first
time in its history,  for instance,  Hak-İş,  which had previously denounced the May Day as “a
festival  of  Jews  and  communists,”  held  a  special  meeting  on  May  Day  to  discuss  the  labor
problems.
4.  “El charro” refers to traditional horseman in Mexico, i.e. the cowboy. The nickname of the
union leader stems from his cowboy-like attire.  Since the charrazo incidence,  coopted union
leaders are referred as charro.
5.  See Hernandez Juarez’  speech at  the launching of  UNT:  http://www.unt.org.mx/dialogos/
intervfhj2703.htm
6.  http://www.unt.org.mx/dialogos/manifte2503.htm
ABSTRACTS
This article explores the variation in state policy toward labor unions in the context of neoliberal
market reforms by cross-examining the cases of Turkey and Mexico. Although taming the power
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of unions so as to decrease resistance to market reforms and increase labor market flexibility
remained a somewhat common objective to the neoliberal agenda across nations, governments
understood  “labor’s  challenge”  in  different  ways,  due  to  their  nations’  distinct  histories  of
unionization,  and utilized different strategies  and means to deal  with it.  We show that such
differences help explain why the union movement in Turkey has become more centralized and
concentrated  in  the  neoliberal  era,  while  the  union  movement  in  Mexico  has  become more
fragmented and decentralized.
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